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Abstract 
This paper proposes an analytic model to improve Department of Defense (DoD) investment 
and divestment decisions. It builds from rules of thumb (RoTs) natural to government 
decision-makers and uses best practice models to improve the RoTs. It suggests three 
recommendations for the DoD: adopt the proposed model and address analytical barriers to 
inform RoT decisions, track investment vs. divestment decisions and Yes/No data points, and 
institute a Divestment Panel. 
Introduction and Background 
Organizations invest and divest resources to prepare for the future and respond to 
events or conditions in the relevant social, political, resource, or business environment 
(Scott, 2006).2 Successful preparation requires an effective and persistent process of 
management. Successful response requires a continuous and dynamic ability to offset 
threats and risks, or take advantage of opportunities. Both successful preparation and 
response require governance and management processes that focus decisions on the 
outcomes of the organization and improve the organization over time.3 Because resources 
are limited, prioritization of activities and deciding what to divest from is as important as 
making decisions on where to invest next, whether budgets are increasing or decreasing.  
Deliberate Processes and Strategic Response 
While commercial businesses deal with these challenges every day, this is difficult 
for the federal government for several reasons. The complexity, purpose (public goods), and 
                                            
 
 
1 © 2015 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. Approved for Public Release; Distribution 
Unlimited. Case Number 15-0971. 
2 “Resources” can include capital, time, and any effort in activities. 
3 The best literature for combining the value of strategic response with persistent management 
techniques can be found in Enterprise Risk Management guides. A recent book includes case 
studies: Fraser, Simkins, and Narvaez’s (2015) Implementing Enterprise Risk Management: Case 
Studies and Best Practices. See Chapter 32 for the lessons learned in the financial crisis of 2008. 
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scale present unique challenges to successful government preparation and response efforts 
(Wolf, 1979). First, the government sector in general, and the Department of Defense (DoD) 
in particular, is riddled with imperfect information and uncoordinated analytics. These often 
drive decision-makers to adopt rules of thumb (RoTs) to make what are usually suboptimal 
resource decisions (GAO, 2014). Second, best and possibly new practices are needed to 
simplify the logic and leverage natural biases already inherent to investment/divestment 
decision-making. Third, improvements in these factors would increase DoD leaders’ 
confidence of outcome impacts inherent in planning cycles, and to be more responsive to 
mission or fiscal disruptions.  
Models of governance responsiveness are also needed to assess the ability of 
leaders to produce results, the accountability of leaders to do what is “right,” and the desire 
of stakeholders to make leaders more responsive in the public sector. This paper will look at 
best practices in the private sector and borrow applicable concepts from other complex risk-
driven domains to derive and present a framework for government decision-makers to 
identify and govern the systematic divestment of low performing investments across the 
organization and free up funds for better operational and organizational choices. The 
proposed construct draws a corollary between typical commercial drivers and the DoD 
resource impact areas of Readiness, Modernization, and Force Structure. The construct 
then proposes to use and assess performance criteria of organizational and operational 
impact, performance viability of capabilities as core competencies of an organization, and 
the economic value and affordability of the investment set for the DoD.  
Human Decisions: “Imperfect” Resorts to Rules of Thumb  
Decisions to divest are often harder than decisions to invest.4 The culprit is often 
emotion or self-interest even when individuals believe they are doing the right thing. The 
challenge is compounded when the possession in question is providing some value, even if 
that value could be achieved more effectively elsewhere. For example, an organization 
decides to outsource an important non-core function to a specialty organization that can 
deliver it more effectively and cheaper than keeping it in-house. While this makes sense at 
an enterprise level, the internal providing unit meets the decision with resistance and 
reluctance driven by self-interest. In both cases, money spent or saved has direct impact on 
individuals involved in the function, jobs, or bonuses. 
In the case of public money, the drivers may be less direct, but emotional 
nonetheless. Transparent governance is often cited as a long pole in the tent for effective 
decision-making, but add to this the notion that divestments are harder than investments, 
and the problem compounds (United Nations, 2003). Criteria-driven accountability and 
evidence- and performance-based management become crucial to preparing good 
investment and divestment decisions because they allow decisions to have a basis besides 
emotion. The absence of such criteria also results in organizations optimizing locally as 
opposed to the enterprise level; the end state is uncoordinated at best, and likely suboptimal 
for the enterprise. Without objective, consistently applied criteria, there is no repeatable, 
impartial way to assess performance of sub-organizations and sub-objectives and how they 
                                            
 
 
4 There is a literature that discusses this fact even for “regular” stock markets, where there is a 
reward—of making money, or losing less of it—when a good divestment is made (Brown, 2013). See 
also Franklin Templeton Investments, 2013. 
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contribute to the success of the overall enterprise. Effective governance of these choices 
relies on symmetric and shared awareness of the impacts on enterprise goals and an 
understanding of the associated risks so informed resource decisions can be made. This 
paper proposes three criteria to enable the needed assessments: 
1. Organizational and operational impacts: impact of decision on outcomes 
and enterprise goals 
2. Performance viability: measurable performance of capabilities that are/are 
not core competencies for the mission and organizational outcomes 
3. Economic value: investment costs and economic value of the 
investment/divestment set 
The Priority Order of Divestment May Not Be the Opposite of the Priority Order of 
Investment 
In the context of organizational decision-making, the list from which divestments are 
selected is not necessarily the opposite of the list of proposed investments. This is true for 
two main reasons:  
 Synergy and scale: The whole is sometimes greater than the sum of its parts. 
Interdependencies may not be exposed until all the pieces are put together, 
and an attempt is made to break the whole apart or remove a part. Without 
tracked data supporting key types of criteria, the imperfect information and 
lack of causality in measurement causes pause when divestment proposals 
are made (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010).  
 No financial meter or value proposition: In public goods environments, such 
as Defense, the lack of a “bottom line” makes comparing the value of both 
investment and divestment choices difficult. For example, which is more 
important: a weapons platform, cyber security, the network, or force 
protection? Size of budgets becomes a meter and this does not promote 
divestment, nor does a notion of “affordability,” which is challenging to define 
and execute (see findings and progress at MORS, n.d.). 
In addition to the uncertainties and omissions in decision making, cognitive biases 
may reinforce predisposed notions regarding investment or divestment options. Table 1 
provides a summary of cognitive biases in the context of acquisition or divestment decision-
making that are shown to result in rules of thumb (RoTs) that are used to make decisions in 
the absence of a performance- or evidence-based approach (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985).  
Table 1. Cognitive Biases in Decision-Making 
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Without a data-driven understanding of the operational impacts and fiscal portfolio 
implications of investment sets, reasoning by analogy can turn perceived familiarity (“We 
have always done it this way.”) into a strategic error about projected outcomes and 
organizational and operational impacts. If not measured and tracked, the impacts generated 
by a particular investment set are easy to over-estimate with the illusion of control. This is 
especially true when emotional biases come into play (e.g., the idea that a broken program 
is fixable and is better than no program at all). Additionally, escalating commitment may 
arise, especially when a project is failing. Personal commitment to “save” the situation is 
natural for risk-averse thinkers. Risk averseness has been shown to increase with wealth, 
and should be relatively high for government fiscal stewards.5 These biases cloud the 
perception of performance viability, and true economic value of available options is not 
considered well enough to substantiate decisions. These all result in rules of thumb (RoTs) 
to help deal with complexity and ambiguity but yield poor choices (Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1999).  
The Government Environment Arrives at Its Own “Rules of Thumb” 
In the absence of shared awareness, legislatively required governance, constraints 
or negative feedback mechanisms, and evidence or performance driven decisions, public 
organizations generally end up with RoTs or traditions that appear to overcome common 
sense (see Table 2).6 The outcomes of low rigor can be inefficiencies and/or omissions that 
cause errors in decision-making in the aggregate, even though they may not have been 
made at the aggregate level.  
                                            
 
 
5 While the income level of government workers may be disputable, and the monies they are working 
with are not their own, government employees are instructed to be highly regarded fiscal stewards, 
and we will stick with that theme in this paper. See Chu, Nie, & Zhang, 2014. 
6 These rules of thumb were collected from MITRE subject matter experts in the area of acquisition 
and resource management. 
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Table 2. Rules of Thumb: Common Government Divestment Approaches 
 
Business Best Practices to Deal With Cognitive Biases 
Because risks and returns are involved in divestment choices, the private sector has 
developed best practices (Mankins, Harding, & Weddigen, 2008). Table 3 compares best 
business practices against the DoD’s common government practice.  
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Table 3. Divestment Commercial Best Practices vs. Common Government 
Practices 





Common Government Practice 
1 Dedicate a team to divestment full-
time, just as you do with acquisitions. 
Reasoning 
by Analogy 
DoD has thousands of people that work on 
strategic and investment planning. Not 
many focus on divestment, but closing 
funding gaps7 
2 Make sure you can clearly articulate 
how the deal will benefit the buyer and 
how you will motivate the unit’s 






Understanding costs of transition and 
divestment is a captured, but under-
appreciated set of costs in the DoD 
because transition takes a very long time 
with many changes in leadership  
3 Work through the details of the de-
integration process before you divest.8 
DoD’s duplicate costs for capabilities or 
services are on the books, yet may change 
names over the transition time, and are 
difficult to track. Limited insight into 
interdependencies 
4 Establish objective criteria for 
determining divestment candidates—





While DoD demands auditability, it does 
not emphasize accountability for losses, 
sunk costs, and returns on investment 
(Under Secretary of Defense 
[Comptroller]/Chief Financial Officer, 2013) 
Towards a Solution 
The model presented here proposes that decisions should be made based on three 
key factors when selecting investments or divestments (Campbell & Whitehead, 2014): 
 Strategic value: the criticality of the investment to operations of the enterprise 
 Performance: potential to improve the business or create synergy with other 
businesses 
 Economic value: net present value (NPV), capital flows (capital required and 
lifecycle efficiencies), and external or secondary effects 
The Proposed Framework and Criteria 
Figure 1 below diagrams the investment/divestment logic for a commercial business 
(Suozzo, 2001). There are three general cases in Figure 1: (1) “obvious” buy/sell cases, (2) 
situations where the candidate is not strategic, and (3) cases where the candidate is 
strategic, but the required competencies or cost advantages are not necessarily evident. 
These latter two cases are most interesting for investment houses, but they are all 
interesting for government, because even “obvious” buys are an opportunity cost of another 
                                            
 
 
7 As repeatedly witnessed by the authors. 
8 DoD architectures are listed in the Defense Acquisition Registry System (DARS): 
www.dodenterprisearchitecture.org/exhibits/Pages/DoDArchitectureREgistrySystem(DARS).aspx 
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choice, so they must not only answer “Yes” to all three criteria, but the choice must also 




But what about self-interest and emotion? The “unmaking” of a product line? The 
transition of support to potential partners? These factors alter the speed and cost of 
transition, which are guided efficiently by negative feedback mechanisms that ensure 
survival (Hardin, 1968).9 
How might this apply to the DoD? For example, in response to wars, a DoD resource 
manager may choose to invest because the capability is strategic and high performing, but 
refuse to consider the high budget share and opportunity cost, or the risks that are unknown, 
or because the impacts to the defense industrial base are unacceptable. We end up with an 
array of buried or obfuscated investments that would benefit from an independent 
divestment panel equivalent. Figure 2 presents a proposed mapping of the business model 
to the DoD’s key drivers. Not only are the DoD resource concepts of Readiness, 
Modernization, and Force Structure attributes that the DoD seeks, but they are also 
Resource areas reflected in the budget (Trunkey, 2013). 
                                            
 
 
9 This article is actually a testimony to what happens when decision-makers choose to act in their own 
self-interest and are not guided by higher order feedback mechanisms, such as the over-grazing of 
public lands or the pollution of air. 
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Figure 3 shows 70 years of DoD trends approximating the Congressional Budget 
Office’s (CBO’s) budgetary definitions of Readiness (all Operations & Maintenance [O&M], 
except Healthcare, Revolving funds, and Civilians), Modernization (Research, Development, 
Test, & Evaluation [RDT&E], Procurement, Military Construction, Science, & Technology, 




At any given time, resources are developing, equipping, organizing, training, 
sustaining, and manning the force, and many dollars may “cross-over” and affect other 
resource pools. The high manpower of the 1950s shows the human warfighting power 
needed in the Korean War, the high Readiness costs in the wars since 9/11 shows the force 
is highly equipped for operations, and the increase in modernization of the 1980s shows the 
DoD’s strategy to the Cold War.  
These appear to be logical given the environments, but there is no objective way to 
assess the relative goodness of the decisions here. Additionally, a criticism across the three 
DoD processes—Requirements, Acquisition, and Budgeting—are that the criteria used for 
decision-making are not defined or well-coordinated (Defense Business Board, 2012): 
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 The processes do not have contemporaneous objectives (some are farther 
out than others).  
 They track the resource pools differently: joint capability areas, program 
executive office families, Budget Activities, Program Elements, 
Appropriations, etc.  
 DoD goal achievement is not measured, tracked, or aligned to resource pools 
to measure any kind of efficacy of planning or delivery.  
While Figure 3 reflects the striking of an appropriate balance, it is impossible to 
determine within the current construct what balances have been achieved (Sledge, 2010). 
Figure 4 provides a summary of the model developed in this paper and shows how an 
analyst can arrive at answering “Yes” or “No” to the evaluation criteria proposed. 
 
 
Figure 5 borrows the logic from Figure 2 and puts the concepts in DoD terms to 
propose a set of criteria to assess such balance. This modified framework applied to the 
DoD should enable the use of a common language and valuation approach so that 
decisions could be made on common criteria of readiness (operational effectiveness), 
modernization (capability performance promise), and force structure efficacy (sustainable 
cost). Every investment set can be assessed against these three concepts with a “Yes” or 
“No” answer. We assume that all investments are compared from an end-to-end basis. 
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Criteria #1: Strategic Value, Impact Readiness10 
Congress uses DoD-provided quarterly readiness assessments to determine 
resourcing requirements of the military (Trunkey, 2013). Therefore, any resource-consuming 
activity that occurs within the DoD should promote or support readiness either directly or 
indirectly. If a relationship between an activity and readiness cannot be demonstrated or 
articulated, then the determination should be “No” to this criterion. All investment sets could 





                                            
 
 
10 Much of this material was taken from Trunkey, 2013, and Osman, Wilk, and Oakley-Bogdewic, 
2013. 
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Much effort is spent assessing how to measure how the DoD resources readiness, in 
addition to measuring Readiness levels.11 The assessments are for units (“unit readiness”) 
and organizations within the military departments, which is not necessarily about an 
investment but the ability of the outputs supported to fill the critical operational logic 
presumed for the mission. Note that it is possible for an investment to have a “No” 
determination for this criterion and still be a viable investment choice. For example, activities 
that do not have a visible impact on the effectiveness of units but that allow them to execute 
their missions more efficiently or economically could be viable investment candidates. 
To meet Criteria 1, the investment set must meet critical equipping, training, and 
operations needs for current or future missions of critical Combatant Command forces or be 
vital to the accomplishment of a QDR Goal.12 Outcome indicators are needed for each 
investment set to track expectations of impact. 
Criteria #2: Core Competency, High Performance, or Modernized 
To satisfy Criteria #2, investment sets should be able to answer one or more of the 
following: 
 Is it a Core Competency? (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 
2012a, p. 2).13 The DoD has nine Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), each with 
Capability Based Analyses and current validated requirements. Each has a 
Functional Control Board that oversees and rationalizes its area’s 
                                            
 
 
11 Recent examples include the following:  
From the CBO, see (1) CBO, 2013, p. 13; (2) CBO, 2011, pp. 3–4 & 8: This report separates Mission-
Related and Infrastructure Related readiness spending; (3) Trunkey, 2013, pp. 1 & 17: Trunkey uses 
Personnel, Equipment, Supply, and Training in his definition (p. 17), as he states, “DoD spends about 
$350 billion to further the readiness of its forces for current and future military operations. This 
includes attracting, retaining, educating, and training top quality military personnel; keeping 
equipment well maintained; and providing the food, fuel and other material needed to support 
operations” (p. 1). 
From the GAO, see (1) GAOb, 2013, Table 1; (2) GAO/NSIAD-95-29 (GAO, n.d.).  
From the DoD, see DoD, 2013, Annexes A–M: Each of these functions can potentially be tied to one 
of the three concepts: A. SPACE; B. CYBER; C. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL; D. MILITARY 
PERSONNEL; E. READINESS; F. MUNITIONS; G. ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE 
COMPONENT (AC/RC); H. NAVAL PRESENCE; I. STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND DETERRENT; J. 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF); K. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND 
RECONNAISSANCE (ISR); L. ENERGY; M. INDUSTRIAL BASE & THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC 
ADJUSTMENT. 
From the CSBA, see Harrison, 2012, p. 16: Harrison stated, “Readiness funding includes the O&M 
budget activities for Operations Forces …, Mobilization …, and Training and Recruiting.” 
12 Criticality for COCOM forces is planned for by each service. See, for example, U.S. Army, n.d., 
Chapter 7. The QDR lays out the foundational force structure required from each service, which 
recently, was tied to the FY15 budget submission funding the force structures. See also 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16567 and 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_Budget_Request.pdf.  
13 While it is true that the Joint Staff keeps track of all requirements in the DoD, not all investments 
have formal requirements: “The responsibilities of the JROC over ‘joint military requirements’ include 
both joint requirements and single DOD Component requirements which makeup the entirety of the 
capabilities of the joint force and enable the DOD core mission areas” (CJCS, 2012 p. GL-6). 
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requirements (CJCS, 2012a, p. 2; CJCS, 2012b, Enclosure G). The DoD also 
conducts a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) every four years, and key 
goals are established with this review.  
 Does it deliver High Performance? The Joint Capability Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) Manual provides a guide to parameterizing 
performance, which is a full array of metrics to gauge performance of a 
military system’s actual and projected performance: Capability Performance 
(each JCA has defined performance attributes), Force Protection, 
Survivability, Sustainment (which includes Reliability and operating and 
sustainment costs), Net-Readiness, Training, and Energy (CJCS, 2012b).14 
Even if an investment set is not in the JCIDS process, these serve as holistic 
and common criteria. 
 Is the Modernization contribution needed? The age distribution of 
investments in the capability area within which the investment set lies 
suggests the importance of modernization to the capability area, and the 
degree to which the funds supporting the investment set in question are 
value-added. A third metric would assess the degree of modernization 
existent in the capability area and the expectation of the investment set’s 
contribution to this maturity. This would include market research on the DoD’s 
need to have a leading edge capability. 
Criteria #3: Economically Sound or Force Structure Supportable 
Investors solely seeking a return on investment (ROI) have beliefs about factors such 
as strategic value and performance for their financial needs. These beliefs lead to levels of 
confidence in investing, which in turn drive preferences over how much to change from, or 
divest from, their status quo portfolio. The preferences translate into behaviors such as 
larger numbers of trades or wider stock diversification. Investors using more highly informed 
analytics traded more (and therefore divested more), had more diverse portfolios, and had 
higher returns (Hoffman et al., 2010). With the general objective to manage the risk profile of 
their consumption stream, investors of all risk types (from low to high: retirement, financial 
diversification, capital growth, hobby, speculation) have various tendencies to “stick to the 
status quo” and not divest.15 
Leveraging Other Fields: Social Return on Investment & Insurance Models 
This evidence encourages the proposed DoD divestment framework to include an 
economic soundness calculation that shows savings or efficiencies for the budget 
environment (Moore, 2009) and consider a wider measure of Social Return on Investment 
(SROI). Not only will the SROI calculation consider the value of strategic impact and 
performance, the SROI concept takes into account two new variables—secondary effects 
                                            
 
 
14 See Appendix A of Enclosure A (pp. A-A-1–A-A-4) and Appendix A of Enclosure B (pp. B-A-1–B-A-
4). 
15 From Hoffmann et al. (2010, p. 16): “Status quo bias is strong.” Mitchell et al. (2006) provide 
evidence that 80% of participants in 401(k) accounts initiate no trades in a two-year period, and an 
additional 11% make only one trade. Therefore, few investors in their sample rebalance. Similarly, 
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) find that 50% of the investors in their sample do not rebalance over a 
nine-year period. 
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and deadweight (Rauscher, Schober, & Miller, 2012)—that make divestment decisions more 
difficult (Rauscher et al., 2012, p. 6): 
 Secondary effects include impacts on other portfolios, including intended 
externalities and unintended consequences (e.g., the effects on other 
portfolios or the defense industrial base as a result of terminating a program). 
Enterprise architectures and cross portfolio management should capture and 
account for these. 
 Deadweight is a placeholder for the levels of productivity or outcome changes 
that would have happened anyway, without the intervention (e.g., technology 
obsolescence or a politically driven decision to withdraw troops). The intent is 
to factor out double counting, especially if more than one or a complex 
intervention is being assessed.  
Based on models of social investment, social entrepreneurship, and venture 
philanthropy, the SROI model captures varied types of impacts and outcomes. It focuses on 
an investment “intervention” at the enterprise, program, or project level. In addition to 
mission effects, their SROI calculation includes how the intervention affects how the 
organization functions as well—activity efficiencies—through the size of secondary and 
deadweight effects, as shown in Figure 6. 
Time and portfolio averages taken from the insurance industry as variables that 
impact actuarial calculations are also worth considering here. For example, as the insurer of 
national security, the DoD’s needs, risks, and cost patterns evolve with threat cohorts, 
weapons, and technology generations over time. How these factors may change and 
complicate lifecycle calculations for costs and returns cannot be overlooked (Lebar, 2012; 
Wadsworth & Woodley, 2013). These added concepts parameterize factors that usually 
“blur” or are omitted from the standard DoD return on investment calculation, making 
divestment decisions more difficult. Figure 6 summarizes the logic model behind the SROI 
concept. 
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Note. Terms and definitions used in Figure 6: 
Context: Economic, political, and social circumstances 
Income: Target group needs; for the DoD, this can be a mission outcome 
Input: Financial and personnel resources available 
Structure: Legal and financial characteristics of sponsor 
Concept: Roles, responsibilities, due dates of targets 
Process: Targets linked to activities 
Output: Directly provided contributions of program/activity to achieve desired impact(s) 
Outcome(s): Effects or desired conditions of target group after activities are completed 
Impact: Overall effects that are logically, theoretically, or empirically substantiated 
Initial: Time for initial intervention impacts to be realized 
Interim: Time for secondary effects to be observed and quantified/qualified 
Long-Term: Time for relationships between impacts and deadweight to be delineated  
 
(Rauscher et al., 2012) 
In addition to Secondary Effects and Deadweight, our model leverages two factors 
from insurance modeling as important considerations (Lebar, 2012; Wadsworth & Woodley, 
2013): 
 First, there is a time element critical to returns on the portfolio. Time is 
important because of the timed targets set in the plan and because 
performance of incoming investments in the intervention may be masked by 
portfolio-wide calculations of ROI. When older investments retire, the ROI for 
the portfolio may rise or fall dramatically. 
 Second, risk categorization errors may occur in NPV calculations. For 
example, models may rate a threat (or policy) being abated by the 
intervention as higher or lower than it should be. Not only will the error apply 
to the investments in the intervention, but it may also affect secondary effects 
or deadweight. 
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What the Model Tells Us 
While the detail in each criterion is potentially exhaustive, holistically the information 
derived from Figure 4 should address some of the biases discussed in Section 2.0 and 
enable improved decisions. Table 4 threads the constructs discussed in this paper. The 
generally omitted criterion in the first column leads to the cognitive bias usually relied upon 
in the second column. This leads to the DoD RoTs for divestment in the third column, to 
commercial best practices recommended to avoid mistakes typically made with these 
biases. These tie to the simple Yes/No criteria presented above. 
Table 4. Tying It All Together 
 
Table 5 summarizes the options across three factors and Investment versus 
Divestment Decisions.  
Table 5. Relations Between Factor Acceptance and Invest/Divest Decisions 
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The following are key observations from Table 5:  
1. The economic factors drive the decisions.  
 Cost Effectiveness drives investment except when mission criticality and 
performance are high, and secondary benefits are high and the deadweight is 
minimal. 
 Deadweight—Other factors actually drive the outcome, not the investment—
uniquely determines investment and must be accounted for. 
 Only in one case are the Secondary Effects immaterial to investment 
choices, where everything else is affirmative (the first column under Invest). 
2. High performance or modernization impact worked with the economic 
variables. The Impact on Balance of Investment Types is also nearly 
collinear with invest/divest decisions. 
3. Mission Criticality may not be necessary for investment selection (e.g., 
when investments drive costs down while minimally impacting missions). 
These conclusions are not natural products of the traditional RoTs discussed in the 
Introduction and Background and further demonstrate how uninformed RoTs lead to 
suboptimal decisions.  
Figure 7 shows some well-known DoD investment and divestment choices overlaid 
on the proposed model. For example, an obvious investment area is Classified Networks 
since it easily meets all three criteria presented by model. The decision to divest of the next 
generation of amphibious assault vehicle is also supported by the model since while useful, 
it does not materially appear to affect the DoD’s ability to execute missions (not mission 
critical), and, crucially, it presented limited force structure supportability. An example of a 
non-mission critical/non-strategic recommended investment area is Defense Finance and 
Accounting Services (DFAS) because it is important for efficiently operating the enterprise 
while minimally impacting actual execution of operational missions. 
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From a very wide discussion of rules of thumb in environments with imperfect 
information to SROI models to DoD criteria and data, we have drawn together an 
understanding of why persistent investment and divestment management data and 
processes can overcome predictable mistakes in resource decisions. We now present three 
basic recommendations:  
1. Adopt the model presented in this paper and address the analytical barriers 
to allow decision-makers to answer the three basic questions presented in 
the model. 
2. Track the logic of Yes/No data points as a feedback mechanism to decision-
makers.  
3. Implement an industry best practice: divestment panels.  
Recommendation 1: Adopt the model presented above to enable shared 
awareness and improved analytics so decision-makers are no longer forced to rely on 
uniformed RoTs to make decisions. 
Start small. Use the model for key program choices, and then for capability area 
choices (such as a program executive office), and then for portfolio choices. Understand the 
types of data needed to answer the questions in Figure 4. Begin using data from the DoD 
Requirements, Acquisition, and Budgeting processes to answer questions previously 
answered by rules of thumb. Enable the population and use of the SROI model, which 
incorporates data from all three criteria sets. The use of deliberate criteria could lead to the 
reward of auditability and the delivery of better results. 
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Recommendation 2: Track the logic of Yes and No investment data points—at least 
at a capability level—so that the logic is captured, results are transparent, and the 
organization improves and learns from successes and mistakes. This will perpetuate 
responsive governance. 
Create a database of Invest/Divest decisions, traceable to the three criteria, and to 
the actual results produced over time. This traceability is difficult, as investments get joined 
and split, and the investment decisions made at the time are often altered before 
investments are actually implemented. The intent can be tracked, however, and the 
investment and divestment strategies can be logically understood. This should help stage 
migration plans so that Divestments become part of the usual process. Make decisions 
using the proposed framework and encourage the use of analytics, tracked to productive 
implications. 
Recommendation 3: Adopt an industry best practice of divestment panels as a way 
to promote the best use of resources instead of relying on rules of thumb as reliable 
predictors. 
The DoD should adopt the framework described in the earlier section, Human 
Decisions: “Imperfect” Resorts to Rules of Thumb, as a method for determining investments 
with simple and meaningful criteria while at the same time employing a divestment panel as 
a portion of their means of governance.  
It should also establish standing divestment panels comprised of non-advocates who 
report their results annually to senior Component leadership. Investment panels exist at 
many levels in the DoD, but per Title 10, the Secretary of Defense and the Military 
Secretaries have the final say on divestment.  
The DoD has the ability to divest, for example, when politics calls for “peace 
dividends.” In response to the 2011 Budget Control Act, the DoD was able to divest from 
$500 billion per year (7%–10% of totals, varied across organizations). The DoD reduced 
Force Structure and also found “efficiencies” under the oversight of Secretary Gates (see 
the Defense Strategic Guidance [DoD, 2012]; DoD, 2010). Cuts can be taken in 
Strategic/Readiness endstrength equipping and training, Performance/Modernization 
upgrades to weapon and systems portfolios, or Economic/Force Structure areas of 
manpower-related investments. Savings take time to realize and are difficult to account for 
when continued operations and innovation are still taking place (Pellerin, 2013). 
The DoD also has the Issue Paper process supporting RMD-700, which allows 
community leaders across the DoD to recommend shifts of resources before the budget is 
finalized. Money moved in this process is usually a small fraction of total spending and is 
considered fallout from the annual budgeting process (Huo, 2011; USD[C], 2013).16 Both 
types of formal divestment processes are normal parts of the current bureaucracy, but do 
not necessarily illustrate a governance process relying on an informed thought construct to 
foster and maintain a forward-looking, innovative organization. 
                                            
 
 
16 In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President Budget Submission, the USD(C; 2013) claimed, “RMD 700 
identifies a limited number of DoD-wide performance goal priorities” and suggests that “DoD 
Component-specific budget justification material should be consistent with” these goals. 
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In a budget-scarce environment, divestment strategies such as those recommended 
in this paper could prove to be useful for justification and selection of the “keeper” 
investment sets. The impact of a divestment panel could be measured. If the DoD captures 
and tracks distinct data on strategic impact, performance, and economic efficiencies, the 
DoD and Congress could reward good results with leadership recognition and continued 
fiscal support to sustain the positive pattern. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper outlined a logical investment/divestment choice structure that corrects old 
RoTs that predictably lead to suboptimal choices. It relies on decision-makers having the 
capability and reward structure to use such a structure in a complex environment. It 
assumes that the DoD institution would be motivated by Congress to hold decision-makers 
accountable, and in turn, these leaders would be rewarded for being responsive and 
productive in their choices. In this new frame, divestments would be seen as strategic 
opportunities, and the reward structure would incentivize accountability and measurable 
outcomes. The following are two recommended next steps:  
 Design a tool for Preparation: Gather data to answer Yes/No questions; 
program tool to produce Invest/Divest choices; alter model’s basis with 
events.  
 Use for effective Response: Use analytics to increase capability of leaders; 
link analytics to “accountability data”; and effectively reward organizations 
and their leaders. 
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